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Published with permission of the author.  "The Century Syndrome" is a chapter from the book The Ghost from the Grand Banks (New York: Bantam Books, 1990, pp. 19-21).  You can buy books by Arthur C. Clarke through the CPSR Online Bookstore.

When the clocks struck midnight on Friday, 31 December, 1999, there could have been few educated people who did not realize that the Twenty-first Century would not begin for another year. For weeks, all the media had been explaining that because the Western calendar started with Year 1, not Year 0, the Twentieth Century still had twelve months to go.

It made no difference; the psychological effect of those three zeros was too powerful, the fin de siécle ambience too overwhelming. This was the weekend that counted; 1 January 2001 would be an anticlimax, except to a few movie buffs.

There was also a very practical reason why 1 January 2000 was the date that really mattered, and it was a reason that would never have occurred to anyone a mere forty years earlier.  Since the 1960s, more and more of the world's accounting had been taken over by computers, and the process was now essentially complete.  Millions of optical and electronic memories held in their stores trillions of translations--virtually all the business of the planet.

And, of course, most of these entries bore a date.  As the last decade of the century opened, something like a shock wave passed through the financial world.  It was suddenly, and belatedly, realized that most of those dates lacked a vital component.

The human bank clerks and accountants who did what was still called "bookkeeping" had very seldom bothered to write in the "19" before the two digits they had entered. These were taken for granted; it was a matter of common sense. And common sense, unfortunately, was what computers so conspicuously lacked. Come the first dawn of '00, myriads of electronic morons would say to themselves "00 is smaller than 99. Therefore today is earlier than yesterday--by exactly 99 years. Recalculate all mortgages, overdrafts, interest-bearing accounts on this basis. . . . The results would be international chaos on a scale never witnessed before; it would eclipse all earlier achievements of artificial stupidity--even Black Monday, 5 June 1995, when a faulty chip in Zurich had set the bank rate at 150 percent instead of 15 percent.

There were not enough programmers in the world to check all the billions of financial statements that existed, and to add the magic "19" prefix wherever necessary.The only solution was to design special software that could perform the task, by being injected--like a benign virus--into all the programs involved.

During the closing years of the century, most of the world's star-class programmers were engaged in the race to develop a "Vaccine '99"; it had become a kind of Holy Grail. Several faulty versions were issued as early at 1997--and wiped out any purchasers who hastened to test them before making adequate backups The lawyers did very well out of the ensuing suits and countersuits.

Edith Craig belonged to the small pantheon of famous women programmers that began with Byron's tragic daughter Ada, Lady Lovelace, continued through Rear Admiral Grace Hopper, and culminated with Dr. Susan Calvin. With the help of only a dozen assistants and one SuperCray, she had designed the quarter million lines of code of the DOUBLEZERO program that would prepare any well-organized financial system to face the Twenty-first Century. It could even deal with badly organized ones, inserting the computer equivalent of red flags at danger points where human intervention might still be necessary.

It was just as well that 1 January 2000 was a Saturday; most of the world had a full weekend to recover from its hangover--and to prepare for the moment of truth on Monday morning.

The following week saw a record number of bankruptcies among firms whose accounts receivable had been turned into instant garbage.  Those who had been wise enough to invest in DOUBLEZERO survived, and Edith Craig was rich, famous. . . .and happy.

Only the wealth and fame would last.

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What does it mean for a computer professional to be socially responsible about Y2K? Not, I submit, a simple question. On the one hand, Y2K is a real problem with potentially life- and safety-threatening consequences for a considerable number of people. Thus, social responsibility by computer professionals requires them to publicize the dangers and, for those in appropriate professional positions, to do everything possible to alleviate the dangers. But on the other hand, fomenting unnecessary fear, even hysteria, about Y2K is, has been and will be socially irresponsible. Finding the line between these is not trivial.

I am told that recently a televangelist in the U. S. claimed that the Y2K problem is the work of Satan and that the great calamity which would result from it is among those actually mentioned in the Book of Revelation. We may--and probably should--laugh at such idiocy. But are we sure that the genesis (no pun intended) of such predictions is not perhaps the result of excessive hand-wringing about Y2K? Then there are those, including, sadly, some computer professionals, who are already storing food or making plans to retreat to cabins in the woods because of the awfulness that will occur on 1 January 2000. Whatever may occur on that day--and, I repeat, there could be some very serious effects, indeed--does any sane person really believe in such an apocalyptic vision of what may happen?

I don't pose as a technical expert on Y2K or, for that matter, on much of anything else. Although at one time my knowledge of computer systems might have merited the expert label, those times are long past. Still, it is hard not to wonder whether the doomsayers have got it right or are even in the vicinity of being right, given the flimsy evidence to support their predictions of trouble or the cost of averting that trouble. Perhaps it is true that, for example, Citibank is planning to spend $600 million on avoiding Y2K problems but, even if this estimate proves anywhere near correct, it is surely true that some (much?) of these funds will be used for normal software maintenance and upgrades.

In the health, transportation (particularly airline), and utility sectors of the world economy, we should all hope that successful efforts will be made to make systems Y2K compliant since failure might well put lives at risk. A similar stricture is in order for production facilities where sudden shutdown could endanger life. And, although the risks seem to be somewhere between minimal and nonexistent (except, perhaps, in Russia), steps should and surely are (see F.A.S. Public Interest Report, Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, July/August 1998) being taken to ensure that nuclear weapons systems are Y2K compliant. Beyond these areas, however, the risks are almost entirely financial and, while these risks should not be taken lightly, most are probably better approached by benign neglect than by major expenditures before the fact. Indeed, a socially responsible position on Y2K suggests the following triage: work flat out on making life- and health-critical systems Y2K compliant, make appropriate effort when major financial interests are involved, but otherwise, see what happens on 1 January 2000 while making preparations for anything that might go wrong.

The last category surely involves the vast majority of all situations. Moreover, very few such systems will prove to be Y2K noncompliant on 1 January 2000. Almost no one believes any more, for example, that credit cards with expiration dates in 2000 will cause trouble. And even when problems do occur--with bank accounts, for example--they will be short-lived and relatively benign. Some people have suggested that "bank accounts could be wiped out" (The Times, London, 6 November 1998) but, given standard system backups, to say nothing of personal records, such an eventuality was never in the cards.

I seem to have detected a lessening in recent months of what can only be called the Y2K hysteria. As Anthony Finkelstein has written, "The vast majority of these stories [about forthcoming Y2K disasters] are irresponsible scaremongering" (London Daily Telegraph, 1 April 1998). Examples of such scaremongering are predictions that those made "cold, hungry and unemployed" (Stuart Umpleby, Internet distribution, 7 July 1998) in other countries by Y2K will view Americans as scapegoats, since Y2K may make Americans relatively even wealthier than they are. Senator Robert Bennett (Republican, of Utah) has even suggested that one result of Y2K will be the largest wealth transfer in history "from noncompliant firms and countries to compliant firms and countries" (Stuart A. Umpleby, op cit). Or how about: "Y2K is probably the biggest problem our nation has faced in 100 years" (J. Wise, email to Harlan Smith, 19 July 1998)?

Indeed, it seems to be true as I write that real empirical evidence about serious potential Y2K problems is still (almost?) totally lacking. What have been the costs of Y2K fixes already made? What Y2K problems have been found which, if not corrected, would have caused serious threats to life, health, or wallets on 1 January 2000? Perhaps it is the absence of such data that has resulted in reduced anxiety; if good data on costs and problems are not available, perhaps the problem is less serious than thought only several months ago.

Since incompetence is a kind of social irresponsibility, CPSR members should be particularly concerned about how Y2K reflects on computer software professionals and, it must be said, on those who taught them. It may be that little blame can be attached to the Cobol programmer who wrote a non-Y2K-compliant program in 1966. But any program written later than, say, the mid-1980s that was not Y2K compliant was written by an incompetent programmer. And buying any such program was a sign of incompetent management. Is the software industry as incompetent as the furor about Y2K would imply?

Of particular note here are embedded systems, partly because there are so many millions of embedded chips and partly because so many of them are in online systems whose failure would generally be more serious than in business information systems. Very few, if any, of the chips in embedded systems were programmed so long ago that it would have been forgivable to ignore Y2K. On the other hand, probably very few such systems are Y2K noncompliant because "most [chips in such systems] do not have a clock function" and, of those that do, many "only measure time intervals between events without reference to days, weeks, months or years" (Alastair McIntosh on Silicon Investor Website, 3 May 1998). This is another Y2K issue for which it would be nice to have some data rather than just claims on both sides.

Y2K presents many challenges to CPSR. In addition to those mentioned heretofore, there is the need to educate the public generally, since many of the more hysterical reactions to Y2K stem from the fact that, despite the ubiquity of computers, "people do not understand software" (Anthony Finkelstein, The Engineer, 1998). As Marsha Woodbury noted in the fall 1997 issue of this newsletter, "Leadership is needed to raise public awareness of the year 2000 problem without causing panic." That is surely as true now as it was over a year ago.

Tony Ralston is Professor Emeritus of Computer Science and Mathematics at SUNY at Buffalo and an Academic Visitor in the Department of Computing, Imperial College, London, U.K. Dr. Ralston is also a long-time member of the CPSR Advisory Board. He can be contacted by email at ar9@doc.ic.ac.uk.

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The year-2000 problem is either massive overhype, a serious problem, or both. The most nagging aspect is that exactly what will happen is not clear, although it is clear that outages in electric power systems and telecommunications would have significant effects elsewhere--transportation, food delivery, water supplies, and indeed the abilities of governments to operate effectively. We have become enormously dependent on computer-communication technology in almost every respect. We should expect that some people and businesses could be seriously inconvenienced--especially in the northern hemisphere, where it will be winter. Thus, it would be prudent for everyone to understand the risks and act accordingly. Panic is not appropriate; however, due care is clearly socially responsible in light of the considerable uncertainty about what might really happen.

All of the critical national infrastructures are increasingly dependent on information systems and the Internet. Public utilities are of concern, particularly with respect to smaller companies. Aviation is potentially at risk, with its archaic air-traffic control systems. Railway transportation is also at risk. Financial systems are reportedly in better shape--potential loss of money is clearly a motivating factor.

For about a year and a half, Congressman Stephen Horn has been issuing a periodic report card on the Y2K preparedness of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The Departments of Justice, State, Education, Energy, and Health and Human Services are all flunking. In recent months, Justice and Education have fallen further behind. Transportation and Defense have only slightly improved their earlier failing grades. Treasury (which issues the checks) gets a D+. (The report cards are on line at http://www.house.gov/reform/gmit.) Furthermore, local governments may be particularly vulnerable, because they lack the knowledge and resources needed to understand the risks.

Calendar-clock problems have been around for a long time; it's just that this one has an immovable point of no return. (There are likely to be leap-year effects as well.) However, much deeper problems are being masked by the feeding frenzy over Y2K. One is a perpetual lack of foresight in building complex computer-based systems. Another is the poor practice of software development, particularly with respect to life-critical and mission-critical systems, with requirements such as very high availability and strong security. One nasty manifestation of development practice is that trying to fix systems, especially in a hurry, often introduces new flaws and vulnerabilities. The archives of the Risks Forum document many of these difficulties.The RISKS archives are available with a nice search facility at http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks courtesy of Lindsay Marshall, or by ftp at ftp://unix.sri.com/risks. You can send automated Majordomo subscriptions to risks-request@csl.sri.com with the one-line text SUBSCRIBE.

Unfortunately, there are no easy answers. Many different operating systems, application programs, programming languages, and databases are involved. Even if everything appears to work locally, interdependencies are likely to emerge when Y2K happens that could not be detected by testing. One of the largely unnoticed problems is that database management systems may have lurking two-digit data fields; heterogeneous combinations of database management systems may result in insidious incompatibilities if different fixes are used.

Intriguing risks can also arise from letting supposedly trustworthy third-parties fix your software. These risks include further flaws, theft of proprietary code, Trojan horses, and liability issues when the third party goes out of business on January 1, 2000. Note that many Y2K repair efforts for domestic software are being performed in other countries. This risk, of course, applies to other nations as well, some of which are in much worse shape than the United States.

One serious concern is that even if no Y2K technological problems occur when January 2000 rolls around (and I seriously doubt that we will escape unscathed), panic may set in as the end of the year approaches. The current Federal Reserve cash amounts would not be adequate if everyone decided to have more than (on average) $1,000 in hand for Y2K. Food hoarding is also likely. Moreover, there already appears to be a huge new market for electrical generators and emergency food rations.

To stave off panic, we may hear from government and utility officials that everything is under control, don't worry about a thing, everyone will be taken care of. But that is also not credible, especially in light of Stephen Horn's report card and the fact that many organizations have yet to begin assessing their vulnerabilities. Such reassurance also runs counter to the grain of logic, based on the archives of the Risks Forum, not to mention Murphy's Law. Even worse, Y2K represents an extraordinary target for terrorists, who just might have read the report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (http://www.pccip.gov). Therefore, realism is required, as well as much deeper study of what the real vulnerabilities and risks are, and what must be done to reduce those risks. But throughout, we must not lose sight of the longer-range issues: there are many risks to the public in the use of computers and communications (for example, see ftp://ftp.csl.sri.com/pub/users/neumann/illustrative.ps or .pdf), and Y2K is just the tip of a very large iceberg.

Peter Neumann is Principal Scientist, Computer Science Lab; Chairman of the ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy; Moderator of the Risks Forum; and member of the General Accounting Office Executive Council on Information Management and Technology (focusing largely on Y2K, particularly regarding the U.S. Government). He received CPSR's Norbert Wiener Award in 1997. His book Computer-Related Risks (Addison-Wesley 1995, more recent information on line) documents many of the risks involved in the use of information systems. You can reach him by email at Neumann@CSL.sri.com, or on the Web at http://www.csl.sri.com/~neumann/.

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One critical year-2000 issue that has not yet been adequately addressed is the risk of large accidental releases of toxic or even lethal chemicals. As many as 85 million Americans live close enough to chemical, petroleum, and other facilities where there is a risk of death or acute injury from a chemical release. Those plants, like most other modern industrial operations, are vulnerable to the Y2K bug. Fearing the economic loss and/or liability of shutdown, many of the companies that own and run those facilities are working to identify and correct Y2K-dependent software and hardware. At least at those firms that are addressing the problem, the chance of a catastrophic breakdown is low.

But it is not zero. And many businesses--particularly the smaller, financially strapped, and less sophisticated ones--are making little, if any progress. A large, unknown number of embedded chips and software that control chemical systems throughout the United States--in fact the world--are Y2K dependent and probably noncompliant. Even if system owners redouble their efforts to identify those points of weakness and render them compliant, there remains a real chance that both industrial processes and safety backup systems will fail. We don't know where the leaks or explosions will occur, but the chance is real that vast numbers of workers and plant neighbors will be killed or injured unless contingency plans are made.

Particularly since Union Carbide's plant in Bhopal, India released deadly chemicals into adjacent communities, residents and emergency responders near U.S. chemical facilities have demanded that they play a role in preparing for the worst. They have a right to know the risks. They must have the opportunity to develop or influence contingency plans.

In some areas, such as Richmond, California--site of numerous toxic refinery releases--emergency warning systems have been established. In Silicon Valley, where I live, municipalities, led by their fire departments, have enacted strict controls on the storage of toxic gases at chipmaking and other factories. To be prepared for Y2K toxic releases, communities need to know which chemicals each facility stores, and how the containment of those substances depends upon the uninterrupted operation of computer systems and embedded chips. Though there are laws and regulations on the books that require some disclosure, they are insufficient. Given the slow pace of the regulatory process, there is scant chance that new rules will be promulgated anywhere in time to provide the public with the information it needs.

Nothing, however, prevents companies that handle deadly chemicals from voluntarily reporting their vulnerabilities to the public, as well as the steps they are taking to manage those risks. Some producers may hesitate, for fear of whipping up more Y2K paranoia. However, I think fear will escalate even more as "midnight" approaches if people remain uninformed. The first step, therefore, for residents of threatened communities, is to ask, even demand, that toxic chemical handlers come clean. Public interest experts, such as members of CPSR, can help guide communities in their inquiries. What kinds of systems are likely to break down? Which ones can be identified and tested before the witching hour arrives?

The next step, logically, is for communities, their emergency response agencies, and chemical handlers to prepare for system breakdown. Operational contingency plans, based upon enhanced monitoring during the Y2K transition period, should establish mechanisms to override malfunctioning systems, contain remaining problems, and warn and protect the public. Evacuation, if necessary, will require extra preparation at a time when other services and infrastructure--power, transportation, and communications--are also at risk of failure.

Third, there are probably many situations in which the risk of catastrophic breakdown on January 1, 2000 justifies the preemptive shutdown of industrial processes. Companies often close down for New Years to save money. They should be able to scale back operations to prevent catastrophe. Then, when the Y2K dust and confetti have settled, that is, when the state of infrastructure, emergency response agencies, and social order are better known, these companies can start up again. Communities unconvinced that protective measures are adequate should demand preemptive protection.

Open preparation will do more than reduce the risk of toxic disasters. It will diminish the likelihood of social breakdown. I recall the classic Twilight Zone episode, "The Shelter." In that story, warning of a nuclear attack drove a family into its personal, privately constructed bomb/fallout shelter. The entire fabric of the immediate neighborhood disintegrated as neighbors demanded entry to the shelter. In our case, an organized, encompassing collective response that provides protection for all will weaken the appeal of competitive survivalism.

There is no longer time to prevent all potential Y2K system breakdowns, but there is time to get ready for them. Public interest groups, emergency responders, and environmental organizations, hopefully backed by state agencies, the federal government, and private foundations, can mobilize to demand the right to know about, prepare for, and prevent toxic Y2K catastrophes. CPSR can help organizers not only to understand the nature and extent of the problem, but to identify those systems whose risk of catastrophe is greatest.

Lenny Siegel is the Director of the Center for Public Environmental Oversight at San Francisco State University and a member of CPSR.

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On June 13, 1998 a number of people involved in Y2k wrote a joint letter to Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Jr., publisher of the New York Times. The letter urged Sulzberger to use the powerful influence of the Times "to arouse the nation to the seriousness of situation."

The letter said,

"It is imperative that we use the few remaining months until December 31, 1999, to fix what still can be fixed and to prepare the public for the disruptions that will affect the safety, health and security of everyone."

We explained why this is such a crucial issue and concluded:

"Because of the urgency action must begin immediately. We are, therefore, calling on you to speak out now. In the attachment [included below] we suggest a number of things you can do. In addition, many of us have very concrete proposals, including ways to assure that systems essential for the safety, health< and security of the nation are fixed in time. We would be pleased to share these with you."

(See also the full text of the original letter.)
 

Following is the response received from Mr. Sulzberger on June 22nd:

"Thank you for your letter. As the chairman of a company that publishes dozens of newspapers, let me assure you I am very aware of the Y2k problem. The New York Times newspaper will continue to cover this issue thoroughly--for all our sakes.

Sincerely,
[handwritten signature]
 

On July 21st, we sent a response to the Times' response.

Here is the portion of the original letter entitled How Y2K Will Impact the New York Times, written by Norman Kurland of the CPSR-Y2K Working Group:

Of the thousands of facts that we could supply to show you the seriousness of the problem, consider just these few.

The electric power companies, including those serving New York City, have embedded controls throughout their production and distribution systems that have not yet all passed Y2K readiness tests. Moreover, 40 percent of power in the Northeast comes from nuclear generation, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has said it will not let plants operate if they cannot guarantee security. Electrical power. What will it mean for your operations if there are extended disruptions of electrical power?

The telecommunications industry has not yet given assurances that their highly computer-dependent systems will all function after the rollover to 00. The recent Galaxy 4 satellite failure was a reminder of how dependent on telecommunications we have become. While the quick recovery was welcome, the situation will be very different if many systems go out simultaneously. As a company now heavily dependent on reliable telecommunications, questions about the safety of the telecommunications infrastructure must concern you.

Railroads and other transportation systems are at risk because routing and switching is now almost fully automated. Consider just the availability of paper supplies if the transportation system is disrupted.

Most large corporations are working to solve their problems and spending hundreds of millions of dollars on the work. As just one example, General Motors reports that it will spend over $360 million. While the major corporations are now aware of the problem and working diligently on it, thousands of smaller firms, which together are critical to the economic health of the nation, are either only in the early stages of remediation or not even aware of how much they will be affected. Many of them are your advertisers or will affect your advertisers' economic viability in 2000.

We are not claiming that any or all of these situations will occur. As Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan said, "We do not know or cannot really realistically make an evaluation of what the economic impact is as a consequence of the breakdowns that may occur."

What we do know is that the impacts will be serious and, most important, we know that every day that massive action to address the problem is delayed the probability increases that breakdowns in key sectors of the economy will occur. Given the interconnectedness of modern systems, such disruptions will rapidly spread throughout the economy.

What the New York Times Can Do

Acknowledge that it is extremely difficult to believe that the Y2K problem could be serious but that you now recognize that it is a matter that will have grave consequences for everyone if adequate measures are not taken in the remaining 18 months until the year 2000.

Urge President Clinton to join you in this recognition. Propose that he appoint someone with appropriate credibility and credentials to head a massive national effort to prepare the nation for the transition to the new millennium.

Urge the business, academic, and political leadership of the country to enlist in a national effort to use the time remaining to correct what can be corrected and to make provision for mitigating the impact of failures and disruptions that cannot be prevented.

Call on the other media to follow your lead and help prepare the nation to understand and cope with the problem. You in the media will play a critical role in avoiding the panic and civil unrest that will be inevitable if the public only discovers what Y2K will mean to them when it is too late to avert major disasters.

Finally, urge the leadership of the rest of the world to follow our lead and join with us in addressing this problem on the global scale it requires.

The following people have also authorized me to add their names as signatories:

Cynthia Beal
Grocer and Moderator
Year 2000 Regional Preparedness Forum
Pacific Northwest
Eugene, Oregon

Pastor Daniel Cormier
Montreal Downtown Church
Y2K Water Discussion Moderator
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Peter de Jager
Speaker/Consultant
de Jager & Company Limited
Brampton, Ontario, Canada

David Eddy
President
Software Sales Group, Inc.
Babson Park, Massachusetts

Reynolds Griffith
Professor of Finance
Stephen F. Austin State University
Nacogdoches, Texas

Gary Allan Halonen
Y2K Policy Analyst
Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Roleigh Martin
Software Engineer Consultant
Edina, Minnesota

Dick Mills
Technology Consultant
Albany, New York

Victor Porlier
Executive Director
Center for Civic Renewal
New York, New York

Alan H. Russell, Ph.D., C.C.P.
Lead I.T. Specialist
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
Allentown, Pennsylvania

Don "Doc" Taylor
President
Hampton Roads 2000
Newport News, Virginia

Robert Theobald
Author, speaker, and consultant in transformational change
Spokane, Washington

Marsha Woodbury
Visiting Assistant Professor
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, Illinois

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Michael Kraig, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

I am heading a project on Y2K and nuclear weapons arsenals at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) in Washington, DC, and London, the United Kingdom. We just released a first report on the nature of the millennium bug, or Y2K problem, as it relates to the Department of Defense and nuclear operations. The report summarizes the generic computer problem, the state of existing DoD Y2K remediation programs (including their many management deficiencies and failures), and possible Y2K vulnerabilities for nuclear weapons and associated operations. In particular, it concerns the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems, which include warning satellites, radar arrays, data storage and correlation centers, and communications nodes. The report's conclusion outlines some general policy alternatives, such as the reduction, or de-alerting, of our alert rates from launch on warning to a lower state of readiness. The entire text (including endnotes) can be found on BASICs web page, www.basicint.org.

I have sent the report to the key staffers of all house members and senators with nuclear warhead storage or deployment in their own backyard, as well as majority and minority staffers on the Armed Services Committee in the Senate. Reports have also gone to some key committee staffers (for instance, one person on Stephen Horn's Y2K subcommittee in the House, which has given "D" grades to the DoD on its Y2K repair progress) and all members of the Senate's Special Committee on the Year 2000 Problem. To support these mailings, we have had several meetings with the offices of Senators Jeff Bingaman, Robert Kerrey, John Kerry, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pete Dominici, Tom Harkin, Joseph Lieberman, and Christopher Dodd. Our hope is that senators such as Bob Kerry of Nebraska and Tom Daschle of South Dakota--both of whom are recommending de-alerting of the arsenals and unilateral cutbacks--will add Y2K to their agenda, or possibly use it to gain leverage with the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in Omaha, Nebraska. In the past several years, both STRATCOM and civilian nuclear planners in the Office of Secretary of Defense have scuttled any attempts to consider de-alerting options.

Helen Caldicott, currently head of the STAR Foundation (Standing for Truth about Radiation) and former head and founder of the Physicians for Social Responsibility, is putting together a symposium jointly with BASIC and the Nuclear Information Resource Service (NIRS) in March with Bruce Blair, Ted Taylor, myself, and multiple experts on the domestic, or energy, side of nuclear power. Our policy goal is twofold: to get Congress to 1) charge the DoD Inspector General to do a series of highly specific reports on individual "high-risk" nuclear systems, including nuclear C3I, and 2) to move ahead on de-alerting (or at the very least, consider it as a realistic policy option).

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has made and is making reports on DoD procedures, test data, contingency planning, and so on for its remediation program, but no one at the GAO is preparing narrowly focused reports on critical nuclear systems. In other words, the activity at this point is at least one step removed from the actual sources of potential trouble.

If you are interested in this program or have your own suggestions for action, please contact me by phone at 202-785-1266 or email at mkraig@basicint.org. John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists has suggested, for instance, that CPSR get 40 to 50 top computer scientists to write a letter to Congress, containing clearly defined goals and policy alternatives, including the tasking of Inspector General reports as well as more technical advice from the field.

As a last note, I should say that BASIC is pretty much alone on this issue. Most expert analysts currently have other well-funded programs, and thus, other responsibilities for the foreseeable future. Other than appearing in the joint STAR-BASIC-NIRS symposium in March, or keeping an updated Web page, no one seems to be devoting time or resources to the topic. I have been looking for ways to split the research pie, since I cannot possibly cover all facets of DoD-STRATCOM nuclear operations. If you know of someone who could help on nuclear weapons, either in terms of original research or as a source of technical information for nuclear C3I and/or launch platform support systems, I would be very grateful.

Michael R. Kraig, Scoville Fellow
BASIC
1900 L Street NW, Suite 401
Washington, DC 20036
mkraig@basicint.org
202-785-1266

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Special Announcement on Y2K

Bill Gates, Chairman and CEO of Microsoft Corporation, announced today that the latest version of their Windows operating system, Windows 2000, would be delayed until the second quarter of 1901.

No reason was given.

POLL: MOST AMERICANS THINK Y2K IS A NEW BRAND OF LUBRICANT TARGETED AT DYSLEXIC MARKET.

From an article by Christopher Buckley in the New Yorker, January 11, 1999, p. 40

January 1, 00

Dear Valued Employee:
Re: Vacation Pay

Our records indicate that you have not used any vacation time over the past 100 year(s). As I'm sure you are aware, employees are granted 4 weeks of paid leave per year or pay in lieu of time off. One additional week is granted for every 5 years of service. Please either take 9,400 days off work, or notify our office and your next pay cheque will reflect payment of $8,277,442.22, which will include all pay and interest for the past 1,200 months.


Sincerely,

Automated Payroll Processing

(Sing to the tune of "Gilligan's Island")

Just sit right back and you'll hear a tale
Of the doom that is our fate.
That started when programmers used
Two digits for a date
Two digits for a date


RAM memory was smaller then;
Hard drives were tiny, too.
"Four digits are extravagant,
So let's get by with two.
So let's get by with two."


"This works through 1999,"
The programmers did say.
"Unless we write new code by then
The data goes away.
The data goes away."


But management had not a clue;
"It works fine now, you bet!
Rewriting code costs money;
We won't do it just yet.
We won't do it just yet."


Now when 2000 rolls around
It all goes straight to hell,
For zero's less than ninety-nine,
As anyone can tell.
As anyone can tell.


The mail won't bring your pension check;
It won't be sent to you
When you're no longer sixty-eight
But minus thirty-two.
But minus thirty-two.


The problems we're about to face
Are frightening, for sure.
And reading every line of code's
The only certain cure.
The only certain cure.

[ key change, the big finish coming]

There's not much time, there's too much code,
And COBOL-coders, few.
When the century is finished,
We may be finished, too.
WE MAY BE FINISHED, TOO!

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From Netiva Caftori, Midwestern Regional Director:

This is certainly a cold, wet winter for a lot of us; perhaps we rejoiced too long this past long summer. Since it is a bit too cold to get out to a meeting, much more is happening in our working groups online. Make sure you join one.

However, in my Midwest region where we are used to the cold, the Chicago chapter met in December for a very educational evening. David Loundy talked about Internet Law; Don Goldhamer reported on his panel appearance at the Madison chapter's joint conference with the ACLU, Data Protection in the Global Economy: Is Privacy Passe?; Ron Quizior talked about the upcoming 4th Annual Ethics & Technology Conference in Boston, June 4-5 1999, and the past Information Systems Education Conference (ISECON). Finally Art Stawinski and I reported on the Boston symposium on Internet Governance, October 9-10, 1998.

The Michigan chapter's annual physical meeting in Ann Arbor on February 3 featured Dr. Jessica Litman, professor of law at Wayne State University. Her talk was entitled "The 105th Congress and the Internet."

Minnesota's members are working hard on providing email for all Minnesotans by July 2000.

I haven't heard much from our other chapters. Lines of communication may be frozen, I suspect. Let's hope spring arrives soon--I can sense the buds ready to bloom . . . Until then, keep warm and high on life!

STUDENT CHAPTERS

The CPSR board has recently voted to recognize student chapters. Since many of you are working on universities campuses I think you may find founding a new student chapter a nice and rewarding activity.

I used to be a student advisor for DPMA and found it exciting to challenge students to improve their leadership skills and get them involved in their new computing profession. It also looks good on their resume. The fee ($20) will remain the same for each student, but since universities support student activities you may get some funding thru them if you can find a few motivated students who are willing to run for the usual posts of chair/treasurer etc. If you need a leaflet to distribute to students, please email Susan (above) and she will be happy to send you a copy. ...Please ask me questions if you are interested in pursuing the idea... Thanks again for supporting CPSR!... Netiva

From Coralee Whitcomb, Northeastern Regional Director:

CPSR/Boston continues to host the TV show "Everybody's Internet" on Boston's public access channel.  Our 1/2 hour talk show gives us the opportunity to discuss many of issues CPSR deals with and to invite local luminaries as guests. We have had guests from government, education, small business, corporations, you name it.  It gives us a great opportunity to spread the word about CPSR!

Our Boston based Andy Oram writes a wonderful weekly editorial for the online "American Reporter" magazine.  He has a wonderful take on many of today's pertinent issues.  An archive of his pieces can be found at http://www.oreilly.com/people/staff/andyo/ar/.

With the start of the new semester, Bentley College will take its first steps to organize a student chapter.  The initial energy will come from students earning extra credit through Bentley's Service Learning program and academic support will come from the Computer Information Systems and the Government departments.